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THE FLIGHT TO NEW YORK:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CHOICE OF LAW
AND CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSES IN
PUBLICLY-HELD COMPANIES' CONTRACTS
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller*
ABSTRACT
We study choice of law and choice offorum in a data set of 2,882
contracts contained as exhibits in Form 8-K filings by reporting
corporations over as six month period in 2002 for twelve types of
contracts and a seven month period in 2002 for merger contracts.
These material contracts likely are carefully negotiated by sophisticated
parties who are well-informed about the contract terms. They therefore
provide evidence of efficient ex ante solutions to contracting problems.
In prior work examining merger contracts, acquiring firms
incorporated in Delaware tended to select Delaware law or a Delaware
forum to govern disputes under the merger agreements less frequently
than firms in other states (New York in particular) specified the law or
forum of those states. For the broader variety of contracts analyzed
here, the contracting parties rarely opt for Delaware law other than for
merger contracts and contracts establishing Delaware business trusts.
New York law is the favored choice, with New York law chosen in 46
percent of the contracts and Delaware law, the second most frequent
selection, chosen in 15 percent of the contracts. New York law was
overwhelmingly favored for financing contracts, but was also preferred
for most other types of contracts. With respect to choice offorum, the
major finding is that a litigation forum was specified only for 39 percent
of the contracts. Among those 39 percent of contracts, New York is the
favored forum, accounting for 41 percent of the choices, with Delaware
* Eisenberg is Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Myron Taylor Hall,
Ithaca, NY 14853, email: ted-eisenberg@lawschool.comell.edu. Miller is Stuyvesant P. Comfort
Professor of Law, New York University, email: geoffrey.miller@nyu.edu. Earlier versions of this
paper were presented at the Columbia Law School Law and Economics Workshop and at the Yale
Law School Law and Economics Workshop. We thank participants at those workshops for
comments. We also thank Natalie Erbe, Jeremy Masys, Sergio Muro, Hilel Pohulanik, Whitney
Schwab, Ezra Schneck, and Cathy Weist for valuable research assistance.
1475
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1475 2008-2009
1476 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4
a distant second and accounting for 11 percent of the forum choices.
When a forum is specified it usually matches the contract's choice of
law. We also explore the decision to designate a forum, mismatches
between choice of law and choice of forum, and whether parties
designate an exclusive litigation forum. Overall, New York law plays a
role for major corporate contracts similar to the role Delaware law
plays in the limited setting of corporate governance disputes.
INTRODUCTION
A firm's decision to incorporate in a state is not ordinarily considered in
relation to a firm's decision, in commercial contracts, to subject
disputes to the law or forum of a particular state. Yet these two
decisions are similar and serve virtually identical purposes. When a
firm incorporates in Delaware or another state the principal
consequence, some minor franchise taxes aside, is to subject disputes
over the company's governance to Delaware law.' Incorporation in
Delaware also frequently effectively selects the Delaware Court of
Chancery as the forum to resolve governance disputes. 2 The chartering
decision is thus a kind of choice of law and choice of forum decision.
This observation suggests that the extensive literature on Delaware
incorporation can be viewed as addressing questions of choices of law
and forum. It also suggests that the literature can be usefully
supplemented because it to date does not consider a wide range of other
important decisions firms make about the law and forum that will
resolve disputes. 3
I See Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67
U. CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1202-04 (2000) (stressing the fact that the selection of the state of
incorporation is essentially a choice-of-law decision).
2 Directors and officers of companies incorporated in Delaware are subject to that state's
jurisdiction over matters growing out of their corporate activities, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
3114 (2009); Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980), and Delaware may be the only
state where, as a practical matter, all defendants in a case involving alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty can be joined. Incorporation in Delaware is a weak choice of forum decision because it does
not purport by its own terms to be exclusive. A plaintiff could bring a suit in any state (or even
abroad) where he or she could obtain jurisdiction over all defendants. Delaware law would be
applied (presumably) in such a case but the forum would be different.
3 Insofar as they tend to appear repetitively in corporate contracts, and to assume relatively
standardized terminology, choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions in corporate contracts
may be considered, at least to some degree, as examples of contractual "boilerplate." Such a
characterization should not be taken as indicating that these clauses are unimportant. A rich
literature on boilerplate, much of it of recent origin, suggests that despite its repetitive and
standardized nature, boilerplate can have potentially significant efficiency effects. See, e.g.,
Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting"for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REv. 899 (2006); Michael I. Meyerson,
The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L.
REv. 583, 594-603 (1990); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1205-06 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1476 2008-2009
THE FLIGHT TO NEW YORK
This article explores these broader questions of corporate choice of
law and forum. In earlier work, we examined contractual choice of law
and choice of forum clauses in corporate merger agreements culled from
seven months of Form 8-K filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.4 Delaware was the dominant setting for choice of law and
choice of forum.5 But we also found evidence of a "flight" from
Delaware, in the sense that acquiring firms chartered in Delaware
tended to specify a Delaware law or forum at a lower rate than firms
chartered in other states specified the law or forum of those states. 6 We
presented evidence that, relative to Delaware, New York and California
were net attractors of choice of law and choice of forum provisions. We
selected corporate merger agreements for our initial study because these
appeared to be the type of contracts in the data set where the attractive
force of Delaware law and forum would be greatest: the Delaware
Chancery Court enjoys a strong reputation as an expert on the issues of
fiduciary duty that are likely to play a role in corporate merger cases.
The present study analyzes a larger set of contracts, not limited to
mergers, filed with the SEC. It expands on the merger contract database
by including six months of other categories of contracts. 7
Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006)
(observing that provisions giving sellers discretion may function to enhance consumer welfare);
Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 857 (2006); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado
About Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45 (Omri Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard Form Contract? An
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677 (2007)
(reporting that standard form online software licenses display a net bias in favor of software
companies); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=l 186143 (finding little evidence
that market power is associated with imposing one-sided contract terms).
4 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975 (2006).
5 Id. at 1987 tbl.2.
6 Id. at 1998-99, 2008.
7 The extra month for corporate merger agreements was used to increase the number of
observations for analysis in the earlier study. Arbitration clauses and jury trial waiver clauses
using the expanded database are explored in Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries
Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate
Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Juries]
(finding jury trial waiver clauses are rarely used in material contracts of public corporations);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex
Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335
(2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration] (finding arbitration clauses are rarely used in
material contracts of public corporations); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily
Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer
and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008) (finding companies that
require arbitration in consumer contracts do so substantially less frequently in nonconsumer
material contracts).
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Existing literature focuses heavily on Delaware's effort to attract
large corporations' charters, Delaware's success in doing so, and the
effects of Delaware's success. Much less studied is New York's
longstanding effort to attract legal business and whether it has
succeeded in doing so. We explore in detail elsewhere the history of
New York's effort.8 The purposes of this study are to determine
whether the attractive force of Delaware law and forum extends to the
larger universe of contracts, to assess whether New York's campaign
for legal business has succeeded, and more generally to investigate the
determinants of the decision to select into a particular state's law or
forum.
We find that New York law was the favored choice of law; 46
percent of the contracts specify New York as the choice of law.
Delaware, the second most frequent selection, was the choice of law in
15 percent of the contracts. New York law was overwhelmingly
favored for financing contracts, but was also preferred for most other
types of contracts. With respect to choice of forum, the major finding is
that a litigation forum was specified only for 39 percent of the contracts.
Among those 39 percent of contracts, New York is the favored forum,
accounting for 41 percent of the choices, with Delaware a distant
second and accounting for 11 percent of the forum choices. When a
forum is specified it usually matches the contract's choice of law.
This paper is structured as follows: Part I sets forth the hypotheses
studied, Part II describes the data, Parts III and IV report the results, and
Part V concludes.
I. HYPOTHESES
Hypotheses about the expected pattern of choice of law may relate
to the type of contract-for example, various kinds of credit contracts or
employments contracts; to characteristics of the contracting parties-
place of business, place of incorporation, and attorney locale; to efforts
by states such as New York and Delaware to attract contractual
business; to perceptions about the quality of a state's civil justice
system.
A. Contract Type
One hypothesis is that contracting parties' choice of law for
8 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
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particular kinds of contracts will cluster around one or a few states even
if no particular state initially has especially distinctive legal
characteristics. We show elsewhere that the presence of two dispute
resolution clauses, arbitration clauses and jury trial waiver clauses, are
strongly associated with the type of contract. 9 Parties presumably care
about certainty and predictability. This can be achieved by
development of a substantial body of reasonable case law in any locale.
Once the venue is perceived as having a lead in legal development, that
lead should induce more parties to contract for that state's law to
govern. Therefore choices of law may cluster around a few states for
various contracts type on grounds of predictability. Such a pattern can
be observed in the growth of Delaware as the preferred choice of law
for questions of corporate governance.' 0
B. Connections to a State
The most natural expected choices of law are states with direct
connections to the contract. A party's business location often relates to
where events under a contract occur. The location of events influences
the governing law under choice of law analysis and also often provides
a set of legal rules developed in light of the contractual events
occurring. For example, oil and gas law develops more and is taught
more in states with these natural resources. Water law develops more in
states with water supply issues. A state's substantive development of
law in a contract's area promotes designating a state's law as the choice
of law. Similarly, a company's state of incorporation often may be
associated with contractual choice of law since the incorporating state's
law can relate to issues that arise under come contracts. Attorney locale
likely exerts its influence indirectly, through association with one or
more of these four geographical factors. The contracting attorney's
state is likely to be associated with choice of law because the attorney is
licensed in the state, is familiar with the state's law, and has an
economic incentive to have its state law govern.
9 Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 7; Eisenberg & Miller, Juries, supra note 7.
10 E.g., Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 213 (2006) ("The more firms
incorporated in the state, the more transactions will be undertaken and hence the more likely a
legal precedent will be established for any particular transaction, providing greater certainty for
future transactors.").
20091 1479
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C. The Delaware Hypothesis
A straightforward hypothesis is that sophisticated contracting
parties will tend to choose Delaware law. The benefits of Delaware
corporate law that attract incorporations can be divided into two classes.
One class of benefits is somewhat specific to Delaware corporate law.
These benefits include Delaware's flexibility and openness to variation,
with most statutory provisions operating only as default rules that can
be avoided by contrary provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws, I I
the substantial body of Delaware corporate law cases, which lends
predictability and reliability to its corporate law, 12 Delaware's reliance
on corporate franchise taxes, which protects against legislation
disfavored by corporate managers, 13 and the relative insulation of
Delaware lawmaking from interests hostile to corporate interests. 14
Some of these benefits, such as flexibility and openness to variation,
might be expected to influence parties towards choosing Delaware law
for contracts generally.
Regardless of these corporate law-specific features of Delaware
law, a second class of reasons for choosing Delaware corporate law
could extend to other contracts. Delaware courts have been applauded
for their high degree of competence and for the integrity of the state's
judiciary. 15  Although these features are noted in the context of
Delaware corporate law discussions, competence and integrity are
judiciary features that might be expected to have appeal beyond the area
of corporate law. The degree to which parties designate Delaware law
in the mass of contracts studied here could be viewed as an indication of
whether the appeal of Delaware law is specific to its corporate law
features or extends to contracts generally.
One might expect a strong association between the perceived
1 E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991).
12 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 274 (1995).
13 Id. at 258-61.
14 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and
the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 762-63
(1987) (arguing that Delaware continues to be "the preeminent authority on corporate-law
matters" because of powerful and unopposed lobbies within the state).
IS See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1362 (2000) (describing literature
claiming "that Delaware, through its reliance on charter revenue and its judicial selection process,
has committed itself to provide corporate laws that enhance firm performance, and that market
forces lead firms to adopt these value-enhancing laws") (footnote omitted); Romano, supra note
12, at 277 (arguing that Delaware is the preferred state of incorporation in part because "the
continuity in and small size of [the court that] hears corporation law cases" produces both judicial
expertise and predictable decisions).
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quality of state civil justice systems and the rate at which parties select
state law for contracts. Parties are expected to be less likely to
designate the law of states with suspect civil justice systems. The
Chamber of Commerce of the United States annually ranks state civil
justice systems.16 The Chamber provides several rankings, including an
overall ranking of state liability systems. The Chamber's overall
ranking is based on the scores for several topics, 17 including treatment
of tort and contract litigation, judges' impartiality, judges' competence,
juries' predictability, and juries' fairness. 18 In the overall ranking,
Delaware ranks first, New York ranks 27th, and California ranks 45th.
Based on the Chamber's views, which reinforce the view of Delaware
has a well-regarded judiciary beyond the narrow boundaries of
incorporation law, one expects Delaware to be a frequent choice of law
and New York to lack strong appeal.
D. The New York Hypothesis
The story of Delaware's possible appeal and efforts to recruit
corporations is well-known. Less well-studied is New York's effort to
induce parties to use its laws. Since at least the early nineteenth century
New York State, and especially New York City, have played a special
role in the nation's commercial activity. New York has a keen
awareness of the financial benefits of choice of law provisions and has
cultivated its role as the choice of law for commercial matters through
early efforts to promote enforceability of arbitration clauses, through
legislation, and through the creation of specialized business courts. 19
16 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY
(Harris Interactive, Study No. 14966, 2002), available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Superior/20Court/pdf/?harris_.2002.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATE RANKING]. The Chamber and other business groups use the
Chamber's ranking studies to try and influence courts to restrict causes of action and constrain
legal actions against the business community. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701
N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2005) (No. 125205); Brief of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Am., Inc., 673
N.W.2d 303 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 99-CV-6553). For prior use of the Chamber's ranking in
empirical analysis, see Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility,
Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348 (2006).
17 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATE RANKING, supra note 16, at 8 n. 1.
18 Id. at 17-18, tbl.5. Other factors include treatment of class actions, punitive damages,
timeliness of summary judgment or dismissal, discovery, and scientific and technical evidence.
Id.
19 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
2009] 1481
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1. History
In the case of finance-related contracts, New York state law,
largely due to the City of New York's commercial prominence, might
be expected to have developed an early advantage for two reasons.
First, the City has been an important commercial center at least since
the Erie Canal, which linked the Buffalo-Albany corridor to the Atlantic
Ocean via the Hudson River, gave the City's port facilities an outlet to
the United States' expanding mid-western markets and created an
efficient, internal New York State system of navigation. The Canal
opened in 1825 and by 1840 New York City's growth had expanded
dramatically compared to other large cities. In the 1830 Census, New
York had a population of about 203,000 compared to about 80,000 in
each of Baltimore and Philadelphia; by the 1840 Census, New York's
population had grown to about 313,000 while Baltimore had grown to
about 102,000 and Philadelphia to about 94,000..20 As the leading
commercial center for most of U.S. history, many sizeable contracts
were formed and performed in New York. This made the choice of
New York law a natural one for many substantial contracts. New York
commercial law thus likely matured more quickly than that of other
states.
2. New York's Courting of Commercial Contracts
Second, New York has openly sought to be an adjudication center
for substantial business arrangements. But that goal was not fully
achievable until relatively recently. The efficacy of seeking to be a
preferred choice of law depended on developments beyond any
particular state's control. As discussed elsewhere,2' throughout much of
American history, an open market for contracts was impracticable.
Courts often refused to enforce choice of law clauses and, even if the
courts enforced them, the clauses conferred limited benefits. The
chosen law had to have a reasonable relationship with the contract itself.
Parties were de facto limited to the place of contracting or the place of
20 Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the
United States: 1790 to 1990, tbls.6 & 7 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division Working
Paper No. 27, June 1998), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/
documentation/twps0027.html#urban. New York City's relative growth rate from 1820 to 1830
was also impressive. The 1820 Census reports a New York City population of about 124,000
compared to about 64,000 for Philadelphia and 63,000 for Baltimore. Id. at tbl.5.
21 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
1482 [Vol. 30:4
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performance. 22 Some regarded choice of law clauses as impermissible
attempts by private parties to displace state power. 23 Even if courts had
enforced choice-of-law clauses, moreover, the parties would have
obtained only limited benefit. Then-applicable conflict of laws rules
sought to impose clear standards for identifying the substantive law to
be applied in contract cases. Thus any court's application of choice of
law rules was reasonably likely to result in the same state's law being
applied. Even if conflict of law principles would select different laws
the effect was likely to be slight, given the prevailing view that
contracts were governed by general common law.24 The Swift v.
Tyson 25 requirement that federal courts apply a uniform general
common law in diversity cases further limited the effect of contractually
specifying a choice of law.
The decline of general common law after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 26
the expansion of personal jurisdiction embodied in International Shoe v.
Washington,27 and modern receptivity to choice of law clauses 28 have
made choice of law provisions more effective. New York State was an
early leader in legislating to promote use of its law and courts. As the
early leading venue for commercial arbitration, New York's arbitration
business was hampered by the legal doctrine that arbitration agreements
were revocable at will and not specifically enforceable in court. Case
law suggested that New York courts were not going to enforce
arbitration clauses that faced revocation.29 Avoiding the revocability of
arbitration agreements required legislation. The New York business
community and attorneys persuaded the New York legislature to repeal
the rule of revocability in 1920,30 and the provision survived a
constitutional challenge. 31 Diversity litigation in federal court could
still avoid arbitration through the revocability rule. The New York
arbitration advocates sought enactment of a federal law,32 leading to
22 See Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: III. Theoretical and
Practical Criticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L. REv. 260, 262 (1910).
23 Id. at 260.
24 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8. Even if conflict of law principles
would select different laws, the effect was likely to be slight. The prevailing view of contract law
was that a body of generally applicable principles enhanced interstate uniformity. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 24, 186 (1965); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (1920) (deeming it desirable "to treat the subject of contracts as a
whole, and to show the wide range of application of its principles").
25 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
26 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 6(2)(d), 187 (1971); see also U.C.C.
§ 1-105 (1) (1999).
29 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
30 1920 N.Y. Laws 803.
31 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921).
32 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
2009] 1483
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passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925,33 which requires federal
courts to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
New York's efforts to attract commercial legal business have
continued by seeking to assure that contractual designation of New
York law will be respected. A contract may bear a reasonable
relationship to New York merely because of the parties' decision to
select New York law.34 New York courts in commercial cases narrowly
apply the principle, allowing rejection of the parties' choice of law if it
violates public policy.35 "Thus contracts selecting New York law
appear to be immune from public policy challenge in New York....
Overall, therefore, it appears that choices of law in commercial cases
will receive nearly absolute respect in New York courts. '36 Even
though most states now also generally enforce choice of law clauses,
they tend to articulate less protective rules than New York.37
New York has also tried to reduce contracting parties' doubts that
judicially created exceptions might preclude application of its law in
commercial contracts. The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York has noted that questions about the enforceability of New York
choice of law and forum selection clauses could deter parties from
selecting New York law or forum,38 and therefore recommended that
"parties to significant commercial contracts should be encouraged to
submit to the jurisdiction of the New York courts and to choose New
York law as their governing law. '39 In 1984 the New York legislature
adopted the committee's recommendations by enacting a law that the
parties to any contract for more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars
may "agree that the law of [New York] shall govern their rights and
duties in whole or in part, whether or not such contract. .. bears a
reasonable relation to this state. '40 Furthermore, any person may sue a
foreign party in New York courts where the lawsuit relates to any
33 Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
34 Cf Mechanic v. Princeton Ski Shop, Inc., 1992 WL 397576), 1992 WL 397576, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1992) (the parties' decision to select a particular law to govern their contract
is given "heavy weight" in determining the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts with a
transaction).
35 In applying this exception New York courts appear to consider the public policy of New
York only. E.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3169 (RCC), 2002 WL
22024 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2002). But see DCMR v. Trident Precision Mfg., 317 F. Supp. 2d 220
(W.D.N.Y. 2004) (fundamental policy of a jurisdiction other than New York may provide a basis
for New York courts refusing to enforce a choice of law clause).
36 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8; see also Hackett v. Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N.Y. 1995).
37 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
38 Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Proposal for Mandatory Enforcement of
Governing-Law Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant Commercial Agreements, 38 RECORD
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 537, 538 (1983).
39 Id. at 549.
40 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2009).
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contract for more than one million dollars for which a choice of New
York law has been made and which contains a provision submitting to
New York jurisdiction.41 Parties to major commercial contracts thus
seem assured that New York courts will respect clauses selecting New
York as the law, regardless of whether the parties have New York state
connections.
3. New York's Effort to Supply High Quality Business Courts
Unpredictable courts would undermine New York's campaign to
attract contracts. Courts that are positively perceived by the commercial
community obviously enhance a state's effort to be a contractually
designated choice of law. Highly regarded courts also should promote
those courts' designation as contractually designated forums.
One theory of Delaware's success in the market for corporate
charters is that the Delaware courts, and especially the Delaware
Chancery Court, offer expert, prompt, and reliable judicial services for
adjudicating corporate disputes.42 New York and other states compete
for litigation and forum selection clauses by offering attractive judicial
services to major commercial parties. 43
Because of their location in the nation's most important
commercial city and their substantial commercial experience, state and
federal courts in Manhattan enjoy a natural advantage as preferred
forums for the adjudicating business disputes. But New York courts
have sometimes suffered in perceived expertise in business matters in
comparison to Delaware's highly regarded Chancery Court's experience
and reputation." And New York courts' docketing practices have led to
dissatisfaction with the quality and efficiency of case processing. 45 In
1993 the state instituted a pilot commercial court program in the New
York County (Manhattan) Supreme Court to address inefficiencies. 46
The state established a permanent Commercial Division of the Supreme
41 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2009).
42 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 39-40 (1993);
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679, 708 (2002).
43 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
44 ROMANO, supra note 42; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431,
435 (2004) (Brooklyn "Democratic Party leadership reportedly sold judgeships for $50,000, with
the bribes being distributed up and down the party food chain," and describing alleged pattern of
systematic criminality, favoritism and malfeasance in the Brooklyn, New York court system.).
45 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
46 The program designated a single judge for assignment to all aspects of a case, thus
eliminating the revolving-door approach to judicial assignments that had characterized the New
York system. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 152 (2004).
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Court in 1995, 47 which enlisted judges and court personnel who were
experienced in business law,48 implemented new case management
techniques, and offered enhanced opportunities for court-annexed
alternative dispute resolution.49 Chief Judge Judith Kaye explained that
the purpose of the commercial division is to give the New York
business community a level of judicial service "commensurate with its
status as the world financial capital. ' 50 Early indications are that the
commercial division is achieving some success, and other states are
following New York's lead in creating commercial courts.51
4. New York's Substantive Law
New York courts and lawmakers also seek to provide legal rules
that are attractive to financial contracts. These include limitations on
lender liability,52 accelerated consideration of actions "based upon an
instrument for the payment of money only, '53 and recognition in July
1997 of the Euro as a commercially reasonable substitute for the
currency designated in pre-Euro contracts. 54  In the area of traded
financial contracts, New York in 1994 revised its Statute of Frauds
requirement that contracts had to be signed by the party to be bound to
establish enforceable obligations 55 to provide alternative means for
establishing the enforceability of agreements for the purchase and sale
of currencies, commodities, foreign exchange, deposits and options,
47 See Daniel Wise, Supreme Court Commercial Division Set Up: Crane, Rochester's Stander
Added to Handle Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1995, at 1. For a comprehensive account of the
creation of this and other business courts, see Bach & Applebaum, supra note 46.
48 The judges assigned to the commercial division serve fourteen year terms and are selected
by the Chief Judge, and thus can be picked for their business law experience. Bach &
Applebaum, supra note 46, at 159 (attributing the success of the commercial division to the
"experience and expertise" of its judges) (citing Legal Opinion Letter from Robert L. Haig,
Esquire, to Washington Legal Foundation (Jan. 9, 1998)).
49 Id.
50 Wise, supra note 47 (internal quotation omitted).
51 Eisenberg & Miller, Market for Contracts, supra note 8.
52 In re Sharp Int'l Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2005); Lesavoy v. Lane, 304 F. Supp. 2d
520, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Global Serv. Group LLC, 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004);
see also Paul Rubin, New Liability Under 'Deepening Insolvency': The Search for Deep Pockets,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2004, at 50; Jonathan M. Landers, Deepening Insolvency Comes of
Age, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 2006, at 4.
53 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 (McKinney 2009)..
54 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1603 (McKinney 2009). Illinois acted almost simultaneously
with New York, and several other states soon followed suit. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 617/1-
99 (2008); see also James H. Freis, Jr., Continuity of Contracts after the Introduction of the Euro:
The United States Response to European Economic and Monetary Union, 53 BuS. LAW. 701,
703 (1998).
55 See Denis M. Forster, Comment, Standard Swaps Agreements Don't Insulate Users from
Risk, AM. BANKER, June 13, 1994, at 20.
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indexes and similar instruments. 56
Based on (1) the natural tendency for contracts to specify a law
that has been substantially developed, (2) New York's history as the
commercial center of the United States, and (3) New York's open
campaign to induce commercial contracts to designate New York law,
one reasonable hypothesis is that major commercial contracts will tend
to designate New York law.
II. THE DATA 57
The data consist of twelve types of contracts contained as exhibits
to Form 8-K "current report" filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for several months in 2002, plus a miscellaneous
category of contracts designed as "Other." Form 8-K must be filed by
reporting firms to disclose certain material corporate events or changes
that have not previously been reported by the company. For twelve
contract categories, six months of contracts, covering the period January
1 to June 30, 2002, were studied. For merger contracts, the study
covered a seven-month period from January 1 to July 31, 2002.58 We
searched all Form 8-K filings and the resulting sample consisted of
2,865 contracts with choice of law information. 59
Cogent theoretical reasons exist for examining the agreements in
this data set. Reporting firms have deemed all the transactions
embodied in the agreements to be material. Because the contracts are
important to the reporting firm's operations, we can assume that they
receive some degree of care and attention during the negotiation and
drafting phase, either from the reporting firm's employees or from
outside counsel. Since the contracts that are written before disputes
arise, one can be reasonably confident that the contracting parties did
not systematically anticipate the nature of any dispute that might arise,
and therefore would not know whether a choice of law or forum would
help or hurt them in the event of a conflict. These characteristics
56 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (2008). New York expanded the provision in 2002 to
include institutional sales of commercial loans by means of telephone or oral communications.
See Letter from Michael P. Smith, President, N.Y. Bankers Ass'n to The Hon. James M.
McGuire, Counsel to the Governor, July 3, 2002, N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2002 S.B. 5669, 225th Leg.
Reg. Sess (2002).
57 The description of the data is based on Eisenberg & Miller, Juries, supra note 7.
58 The expanded period for merger contracts exploits our earlier detailed work on choice of
law and choice of forum in merger contracts. Id.
59 The total number of contracts differs slightly from the total reported in earlier articles
because (1) the key variable of interest for this analysis, choice of law, determined the number of
contracts that could be analyzed, and (2) we omitted trust agreements from our analysis of jury
trial waiver agreements.
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suggest that the contract terms that we observe may represent
reasonably efficient allocations of rights and duties among the parties,
including the two choices made by the contracting parties that are
studied here: the law picked to govern in the event of a dispute over the
contract, and the forum selected for the adjudication or resolution of
such a dispute.
The types and numbers of contracts studied are listed in Table 1,
together with the number of contracts for which we had information
about choice of law. Most of the contract types are self-explanatory.
"Pooling and servicing" contracts are used in mortgage pass-through
and other asset-backed securities arrangements; they represent
agreements under which an owner transfers receivables to a trustee
which holds title to and collects the income from the assets and passes
the funds through to investors.60
Table 1. Types of Contracts Studied (number of contracts in
parentheses) 61
Asset sale/purchase (323) Other (465)
Bond indentures (155) Pooling and servicing (173)
Credit commitments (217) Securities purchase (461)
Employment (111) Security agreements (37)
Licensing (48) Settlements (72)
Mergers (412) Trust agreements (48)
Underwriting (352)
Securities purchase agreements were the most frequent contract
type (excluding the residual category "Other") and accounted for 16.1
percent of the total of 2,865 contracts. Credit-related contracts-bond
indentures, credit commitments, pooling and servicing agreements, and
security agreements-accounted for about another 20 percent of the
contracts. Merger contracts were about 14 percent of the sample but
note that they had one extra month of coverage in the data. Together,
the contract types offer a reasonably rich variety of relations. Several
types, including the credit-related contracts and trust agreements,
obviously involve substantial financial institutions. Others types, asset
60 E.g., Circuit City Credit Card Master Trust, Amended and Restated Master Pooling Service
Agreement (Form 8-K), at 21-22 (Jan. 31, 2002). See generally Thomas E. Planck, The Security
of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1655 (2004). Trust
agreements establish these trusts and define certain of their powers and responsibilities. E.g.,
First Consumers National Bank, Trust Agreement Between First Consumers Credit Corporation,
as Seller, and Bankers Trust Company, as Owner Trustee (Form 8-K) (Jan. 31, 2002).
61 SEC EDGAR DATABASE, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS DATABASE, Jan. 1, 2002, to June 30,
2002 for all contract types other than mergers, and Jan. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002, for merger
contracts [hereinafter EDGAR].
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sale/purchase and merger contracts, involve corporate restructurings.
Settlements involve resolution of disputes. Employment contracts offer
insights into choice of law in agreements between key individual
employees and large corporate employers.
III. CHOICE OF LAW RESULTS
This Part first reports the overall pattern of choice of law clauses in
the data.62 It then explores factors that might be associated with choice
of law, including type of contract, place of business, place of
incorporation, attorney locale, and perception of state civil justice
system fairness. Throughout, we note the results for New York and
Delaware in light of their efforts to attract law-related business.
A. The Overall Pattern of Choice of Law Clauses
Table 2 shows the basic pattern of choice of law by locale. New
York's dominance is striking. It is the choice of law in approximately
46 percent of contracts. New York's share rises to over 50 percent if
one excludes the merger contracts in which Delaware dominates by
being the choice of law in over one-third of the agreements. With
respect to all contract types combined, Delaware is a distant second
62 Choice of law provisions will generally be respected by courts in the United States
provided that they are enforceable under ordinary contract principles. See, e.g., William J.
Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS
Bus. L.J. 1 (2006). There may be a limited exception for matters going to the internal affairs of
corporations, where courts may reject the selection of a law other than the law of the state of
incorporation. See Sokol v. Ventures Educ. Sys. Corp., No. 602856/02, 2005 WL 3249447 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 27, 2005) ("Under New York law, the law of the incorporating state has
traditionally been applied to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation."). A state may also
refuse to enforce a choice-of-law provision if the contract bears no reasonable relationship to the
state whose law is selected of if application of the law chosen would contravene an important
policy of another (usually the forum) state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187(2) (1971) (amended 1989) ("[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied ... unless either (a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for
the parties' choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties."). A number of
states-New York being a prime example-provide assurances that for significant commercial
contracts of the sort contained in our data set, New York courts will respect a forum selection
clause selecting New York law despite the lack of contacts with the state. Eisenberg & Miller,
Market for Contracts, supra note 8. Even in the unusual cases where there is doubt about
enforceability, the parties' decision to opt for a particular state's law presumably reflects their
judgment about the rules that they prefer to govern disputes under the contract.
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with about 15 percent. After Delaware, no state accounts for even ten
percent of the choices of law and only California even exceeds five
percent.
Table 2. Distribution of Choice of Law Locales 63
Locale Number of Percent of Locale Number of Percent of
contracts Contracts contracts contracts
AZ 16 0.56 NC 11 0.38
CA 219 7.64 NJ 27 0.94
CAN 30 1.05 NV 67 2.34
CO 45 1.57 NY 1309 45.69
CT 7 0.24 OH 36 1.26
DE 418 14.59 Other 215 7.50
FL 97 3.39 PA 37 1.29
GA 30 1.05 TX 96 3.35
IL 71 2.48 UT 17 0.59
MA 55 1.92 VA 21 0.73
MD 17 0.59 WA 24 0.84
Total 2865 100.00
New York's dominance suggests that both its commercial history
and its longstanding efforts to attract commercial contracts have been
successful. New York's dominance also supports the hypothesis that
choices of law will tend to cluster around one or a few states because of
the increased development of the law in those states.
B. Choice of Law by Contract Type
Table 3 shows that choice of law is strongly associated with
contract type. It shows, for each contract type, the number and percent
of contracts choosing a locale's law. For ease of presentation, we limit
the output to four choices of law, Delaware, New York, California, and
Other. Delaware dominates for one type of contract-trust agreements.
Thirty-nine of 48 trust agreements provided for Delaware law to govern.
The dominance of Delaware for this specialized type of contract is
apparently due to the advantages and flexibility of Delaware's business
trust statute. 64 Other than trust agreements, however, the principal
choice of law result is New York's dominance. Table 2 above shows
63 EDGAR, supra note 61.
64 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Rise of the Statutory Business Trust (Aug. 9, 2007) (on file with
author). Sitkoff found that 1,517 statutory business trusts were formed in Delaware during 2002,
by far the leading state for such formations. The closest competitor was Massachusetts, with 674
trusts being formed in that year.
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that New York is the choice of law in almost half the contracts. Table 3
shows that this dominance extends across a broad range of contract
types. New York law governs a higher proportion of contracts than
either Delaware or California for ten of thirteen contract types.
New York's overall dominance eclipses Delaware's dominance as
a choice of law in merger agreements. Delaware accounted for about 32
percent of the governing law clauses in merger agreements, with New
York a distant second and California ranking third. When more
contract types are considered, the pattern that emerges is even more
lopsided towards New York as a choice of law.
Table 3. Choice of Law by Type of Contract 65
Choice of law
Contract type DE NY CA Other Total
Asset sale purchase 32 82 30 179 323
Percent 9.91 25.39 9.29 55.42 100.00
Bond indentures 1 138 4 12 155
Percent 0.65 89.03 2.58 7.74 100.00
Credit commitments 6 105 9 97 217
Percent 2.76 48.39 4.15 44.70 100.00
Employment contracts 6 12 14 79 111
Percent 5.41 10.81 12.61 71.17 100.00
Licensing 5 10 8 26 49
Percent 10.20 20.41 16.33 53.06 100.00
Mergers 133 69 51 159 412
Percent 32.28 16.75 12.38 38.59 100.00
Other 89 185 42 152 468
Percent 19.02 39.53 8.97 32.48 100.00
Pooling service 17 149 0 7 173
Percent 9.83 86.13 0.00 4.05 100.00
Securities purchase 78 189 46 151 464
Percent 16.81 40.73 9.91 32.54 100.00
Security agreements 0 22 3 12 37
Percent 0.00 59.46 8.11 32.43 100.00
Settlements 12 13 11 37 73
Percent 16.44 17.81 15.07 50.68 100.00
Trust agreements 39 7 0 2 48
Percent 81.25 14.58 0.00 4.17 100.00
Underwriting 0 328 1 23 352
Percent 0.00 93.18 0.28 6.53 100.00
Total 418 1,309 219 936 2,882
Percent 14.50 45.42 7.60 32.48 100.00
65 EDGAR, supra note 61.
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Our earlier study of merger contracts demonstrated that although
Delaware led all other states as a place of incorporation, choice of law,
and litigation forum, once one accounted for Delaware as the place of
incorporation, firms tended to flee Delaware as a choice of law and
forum. This effect is more pronounced in the broader data base of
contracts. Table 2 suggests that, across a broad range of contracts, the
major pattern is not so much a flight from Delaware as it is the
attraction of New York.
Table 3 shows three type of contracts, employment, licensing, and
settlements, in which neither New York nor Delaware account for even
25 percent of the choices of law. None of these contract types falls
within the core areas for which New York and Delaware have
campaigned. New York's dominant thrust has been in the area of
finance contracts. Table 3 suggests that it has been highly successful
across several types of finance and credit contracts, despite Delaware's
efforts to attract finance contracts. 66 New York's prominence is this area
likely is reinforced by the location of large banks in New York. As
lenders, they need not be the reporting firm for SEC purposes, but they
may insist on New York law applying to loan agreements. Delaware's
historic emphasis on attracting incorporations and its establishment of
specialized trust legislation do not extend to the three contract types that
escape its and New York's domination.
C. Choice of Law and State Contacts
In addition to contract type, one might expect a business's location
to be associated with the contract's choice of law. Business location is
associated with where events affecting a business might occur. Thus,
the location of events influences choice of law and forum. Place of
business is often associated with choice of law,67 but they are not
always the same.
Since contracts have at least two parties, most contracts can be
associated with more than one business locale. For purposes of some
analyses, however, it is helpful to associate a contract with a unique
place of business. Designating a unique place of business for each
contract requires considering the nature of the contract. 68 For example,
for merger contracts, two places of business are plausible: that of the
acquiring company and that of the acquired company. For merger and
other contracts, when associating a contract with a single place of
66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2702A (2009) (effort to keep asset backed securities transactions
out of bankruptcy entanglements).
67 See generally Eisenberg & Miller, Mergers, supra note 4.
68 This paragraph is based on Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 7.
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business we used what one would normally expect to be the dominant
place of business. For example, for merger contracts, we used the
acquiring company's place of business. Table 4's "First place of
business" column shows the business locales chosen for 12 types of
contracts. Because of the varied nature of the residual "Other" contracts
category, we excluded such contracts from this analysis.
Other of our analyses below allow a contract to be associated with
two parties' places of business. A second party's business locale is
usually simply that of the second party to the contract. For a few
contract categories, the second locale could be that of a substantive
party or a trustee. Table 4's "Second place of business column" shows
the second business locale chosen for 11 types of contracts. In the case
of employment contracts, the second party is an individual and we do
not associate such contracts with a business locale other than that of the
employer.
Table 4: Places of Business by Contract Type69
Contract type First party's place of Second party's place of
business business
Asset sale Buyer's place of notice Seller's place of business
purchase location
Bond indentures Issuer's place of business Indenture trustee's place of
notice
Credit Principal lender's Borrower's place of
commitments designated office business
Employment Employer's place of Not applicable
contracts business
Licensing Licensor's place of business Licensee's place of business
Mergers Acquiring company's place Acquired company's place
of business of business
Pooling service Depositor's place of Servicer's place of business
business
Securities Issuer's place of business Buyer's place of business
purchase
Security Registrant's place of Adversary's place of
agreements business business
Settlements Reporting company's place Adversary's place of
of business business
Trust agreements Registrant's place of Adversary's place of
business business
Underwriting Issuer's place of business Lead underwriter's place of
I business
69 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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Table 5 reports the relation between the first place of business and
choice of law. To keep the output manageable, we report results only
for states that were the place of business or choice of law for a
reasonable number of contracts. States with few contracts are included
in the residual category, "Other."
Table 5. First Party's Place of Business and Choice of Law70
Choice of law
Place of CA DE FL IL MA NV NY Other TX Total
business
CA 129 62 5 6 0 12 142 22 4 382
33.77 16.23 1.31 1.57 0.00 3.14 37.17 5.76 1.05 100.00
DE 0 16 0 0 0 0 22 2 0 40
0.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.00 5.00 0.00 100.00
FL 1 10 51 1 0 2 44 6 0 115
0.87 8.70 44.35 0.87 0.00 1.74 38.26 5.22 0.00 100.00
IL 1 22 0 32 0 0 32 4 2 93
1.08 23.66 0.00 34.41 0.00 0.00 34.41 4.30 2.15 100.00
MA 4 13 0 0 31 0 23 3 0 74
5.41 17.57 0.00 0.00 41.89 0.00 31.08 4.05 0.00 100.00
NV 2 8 1 1 0 10 15 6 1 44
4.55 18.18 2.27 2.27 0.00 22.73 34.09 13.64 2.27 100.00
NY 4 23 1 3 1 0 233 22 2 289
1.38 7.96 0.35 1.04 0.35 0.00 80.62 7.61 0.69 100.00
Other 29 152 24 16 8 35 510 380 10 1,164
2.49 13.06 2.06 1.37 0.69 3.01 43.81 32.65 0.86 100.00
TX 7 23 2 3 0 3 103 14 58 213
3.29 10.80 0.94 1.41 0.00 1.41 48.36 6.57 27.23 100.00
Total 177 329 84 62 40 62 1,124 459 77 2,414
7.33 13.63 3.48 2.57 1.66 2.57 46.56 19.01 3.19 100.00
Table 5's bold diagonal entries show a strong association between
place of business and choice of law. Reading across the table's rows
shows that, for every locale, the place of business ranks no lower than
second as the choice of law. But the table also confirms the strong
attraction of New York law. Only New York as the choice of law
trumps the place of business as the choice of law. New York trumps the
place of business for every state except Florida, where New York is the
second choice, and Illinois, where New York ties Illinois for the number
of choices of law.
One also expects a business's place of incorporation to be
associated with a contract's choice of law. Place of incorporation sets
the applicable law for most questions of corporate governance and
establishes a corporation's connection to a state. Like place of business,
70 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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place of incorporation is often associated with choice of law,7' but they
are not always the same.
Table 6 reports the relation between place of incorporation and
choice of law. Again, to keep the output manageable, we report results
only for states that were the place of incorporation or choice of law for a
reasonable number of contracts. States with few contracts are included
in the residual category, "Other." The first place of incorporation for a
contract is assigned using the same criteria described in Table 4. For
example, in merger contracts, the acquiring company's place of
incorporation is used.
Table 6. First Party's Place of Incorporation and Choice of Law72
Choice of law
Place of CA DE FL IL MA NV NY Other TX Total
incorporation
CA 44 5 0 0 0 0 26 10 1 86
51.16 5.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.23 11.63 1.16 100.00
DE 81 246 21 30 19 4 607 109 22 1,139
7.11 21.60 1.84 2.63 1.67 0.35 53.29 9.57 1.93 100.00
FL 0 1 32 0 0 0 18 7 0 58
0.00 1.72 55.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.03 12.07 0.00 100.00
IL 0 1 0 5 0 0 4 2 1 13
0.00 7.69 0.00 38.46 0.00 0.00 30.77 15.38 7.69 100.00
MA 1 1 0 0 8 0 3 1 0 14
7.14 7.14 0.00 0.00 57.14 0.00 21.43 7.14 0.00 100.00
NV 19 5 8 2 1 36 29 43 4 147
12.93 3.40 5.44 1.36 0.68 24.49 19.73 29.25 2.72 100.00
NY 1 6 0 0 0 1 63 3 1 75
1.33 8.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.33 84.00 4.00 1.33 100.00
Other 30 60 21 25 12 21 355 281 31 836
3.59 7.18 2.51 2.99 1.44 2.51 42.46 33.61 3.71 100.00
TX 1 4 2 0 0 0 19 3 17 46
2.17 8.70 4.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 41.30 6.52 36.96 100.00
Total 177 329 84 62 40 62 1,124 459 77 2,414
7.33 13.63 3.48 2.57 1.66 2.57 46.56 19.01 3.19 100.00
Table 6's bold diagonal entries show a strong association between
place of incorporation and choice of law. For every locale, the place of
incorporation ranks either first or second as the choice of law. New
York is again the most prominent choice of law outside the state of
incorporation. Only New York as the choice of law trumps the place of
incorporation as the choice of law, and it does so in Delaware and
Texas. Otherwise New York is the second leading choice of law.
New York thus dominates as a choice of law for contracts with
Delaware corporations but is not as dominant as a choice of law for
71 See generally Eisenberg & Miller, Mergers, supra note 4.
72 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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contracts without Delaware corporations. Thus, if a company has
decided not to incorporate in Delaware, that is also something of a
signal that the company prefers its own state law over New York law.
Attorney locale, while often associated with place of business, is
also expected to be associated with a contract's choice of law. An
attorney is familiar with the law of his or her own state and has an
economic stake in that state's law applying.
Table 7 reports the relation between attorney locale and choice of
law. Again, to keep the output manageable, we report results only for
states that were the attorney locale or choice of law for a reasonable
number of contracts. States with few contracts are included in the
residual category, "Other." Attorney locale for a contract is assigned
using the same criteria described in Table 4.
Table 7. First Party's Attorney Locale and Choice of Law73
Choice of law
Attorney CA DE FL IL MA NV NY Other TX Total
locale
CA 55 46 4 1 0 6 57 12 1 182
30.22 25.27 2.20 0.55 0.00 3.30 31.32 6.59 0.55 100.00
DE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
FL 0 3 15 0 1 2 6 2 2 31
0.00 9.68 48.39 0.00 3.23 6.45 19.35 6.45 6.45 100.00
IL 1 20 1 9 2 0 13 4 1 51
1.96 39.22 1,96 17.65 3.92 0.00 25.49 7.84 1.96 100.00
MA 2 12 1 0 18 0 17 5 0 55
3.64 21.82 1.82 0.00 32.73 0.00 30.91 9.09 0.00 100.00
NV 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 5
0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 40.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
NY 2 40 12 5 2 0 183 24 1 269
0.74 14.87 4.46 1.86 0.74 0.00 68.03 8,92 0.37 100.00
Other 116 194 51 44 17 52 794 405 56 1,729
6.71 11.22 2.95 2.54 0.98 3.01 45.92 23.42 3.24 100.00
TX 1 12 0 2 0 0 52 7 16 90
1.11 13.33 0.00 2.22 0.00 0.00 57.78 7.78 17.78 100.00
Total 177 329 84 62 40 62 1,124 459 77 2,414
7.33 13.63 3.48 2.57 1.66 2.57 46.56 19.01 3.19 100.00
Table 7's bold diagonal entries show a strong association between
attorney locale and choice of law. For every locale, the place of
incorporation ranks no lower than third as the choice of law. New York
is the most prominent choice of law outside the attorney locale; it
always ranks first or second.
Table 8 provides a summary perspective of the relations between
choice of law and (1) business locale, (2) place of incorporation, and (3)
73 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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attorney locale. It shows the distributions by state of these attributes, as
well as contract type, that might be expected to be associated with the
choice of law pattern.
Table 8. Distribution by Locale of: Reporting Firm's Place of

































































































































Table 8 establishes that New York's choice of law dominance
likely does not stem from contract-specific contacts with New York.
New York accounts for only about 12 percent of the reporting firms'
places of business, three percent of the reporting firms' places of
incorporation, and eleven percent of the attorney locales. Yet Table 2
shows that it accounts for about 46 percent of the choices of law. If
place of business dictated choice of law, then California, with almost 16
percent of the places of business, would be far more prominent as a
choice of law. Yet Table 2 shows that California accounts for less than
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eight percent of the choices of law.
Tables 6 and 8 confirm Delaware's dominance as a place of
incorporation for publicly held firms. Delaware is the reporting firm's
state of incorporation for approximately 47 percent of agreements.
Other than Delaware, only Nevada achieves even a five percent share of
the reporting firm-incorporation market. Large or commercially
prominent states-California, New York, and Texas-have miniscule
shares of the incorporation market but substantial or nontrivial shares of
the reporting firms' places of business. Delaware's attraction is thus not
a function of where companies do substantial business. Delaware is the
"Reporting firm place of business" for less than two percent of firms.
Here California and New York are more dominant, with Texas third. If
place of incorporation dictated choice of law, then Delaware's percent
of the incorporations would lead it to dominate the choice of law pattern
instead of New York.
We were able to identify attorney addresses for approximately 38
percent of the contracts. New York accounted for 11 percent of the
attorney locales, or about 29 percent of the known attorney locales.
Even if the 68 percent of unknown attorney locales were distributed in
the same pattern as the known locales, New York's choice of law share
would far outstrip its core contacts with the contracts.
One can assess the degree to which New York and other states
attract choices of law without having core contacts with the contract.
How often do contracts designate a choice of law other than the
reporting firm's place of business, the reporting firm's place of
incorporation, or the reporting firm's attorney's locale? To explore this,
we construct a dummy "match" variable equal to one if the contract's
choice of law matches any of the three core characteristics: the reporting
firm's place of business, the reporting firm's place of incorporation, or
the reporting firm's attorney's locale. The variable equals zero if the
contract's choice of law matches none of the three characteristics. A
second match dummy variable counts as a match all contracts for which
the first match variable equals one and adds as matches contracts in
which the choice of law matches the place of business or place of
incorporation of the second party to the contract, as designated in Table
4. Table 9 presents the results for both matching dummy variables.
Columns (1) and (2) report results for the first match variable; columns
(3) and (4) report results for the expanded match variable.
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Table 9. Percent of Choices of Law That Match Place of Business,
Place of Incorporation, or Attorney's Locale
75
Contracts that match reporting Contracts that match reporting
firm's place of business or firm's place of business or
incorporation, or attorney's incorporation, attorney's locale, or
locale second party's place of business or
incorporation
Number Percent Number of Percent
of contracts
contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
12 66.7 13 92.3
162 82.7 163 93.3
34 70.6 34 94.1
5 60.0 5 80.0
321 78.2 327 94.2
77 75.3 80 91.3
20 75.0 20 95.0
54 64.8 57 80.7
36 88.9 37 91.9
16 62.5 16 93.8
8 62.5 8 62.5
18 77.8 18 100.0
60 61.7 62 93.5
1072 33.5 1076 61.5
26 57.7 28 89.3
172 98.3 173 99.4
32 87.5 32 96.9
63 84.1 67 92.5
15 93.3 15 93.3
17 70.6 17 100.0
16 93.8 16 93.8
2236 57.7 2264 78.4
The table shows New York's distinction in having by far the
lowest rate of contracts that designate it as a choice of law, and that
have a core contact with the state. Using the first match variable
(columns (1) and (2)), New York's 34 percent rate is followed by
Ohio's 58 percent rate but Ohio has only 26 choices of law. The vast
majority of contracts that designate a choice of law lacking a core
contact do so because they designate New York or Delaware law.
Overall 92.4 percent of the contracts that designate a state law with
which it has a core contact, designate New York or Delaware law. This
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result is not sensitive to the inclusion of contracts with non U.S. parties.
Excluding them increases the 92.4 percent to 93 percent.
The expanded match variable reported in columns (3) and (4)
confirms the pattern even after accounting for second party business and
incorporation contacts with a state. New York's match rate is 61.5
percent, well below the overall match rate of 78.4 percent, and New
York remains the state with the highest rate of contracts specifying its
law that lack a measurable contact with the state.
D. Choice of Law and Rating of State Civil Liability Systems
As noted above, of the three states with the most choices of law,
the Chamber of Commerce ranks the civil liability system of Delaware
to be by far the best-number one of all the states-New York ranks
below the median state, and California ranks near the bottom. The
Chamber's members' actual contracting behavior is not consistent with
the survey rankings. In fact, outside the area of mergers and specialized
trust agreements, large public corporations choose New York law the
most, California law next, and Delaware law the least. The Chamber's
members' concerns about New York and California likely reflect
perceptions about court systems when a large corporation is litigating
against private individuals in, for example, a tort case. A possible
explanation for the patterns observed in the Chamber's survey and in
corporate contracting behavior is that large corporations perceive New
York's civil justice system to be near the best in matters of contract law,
but below the median state in other matters that survey respondents
focus on when responding to the survey. Given the Chamber's use of
the survey in litigation, 76 the survey appears to be used to support tort
reform but is otherwise often ignored in the actual behavior of large
corporations.
E. Choice of Law Regression Model
The previous subsections separately assess the relationship
between choice of law and (1) contract type, (2) place of business, (3)
place of incorporation, and (4) attorney locale. The principal result is
New York's dominance as a choice of law. We therefore further
explore in regression models the factors associated with designating
New York as the choice of law as a simultaneous function of the above
characteristics. We exclude the Chamber of Commerce rankings
76 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STATE RANKING, supra note 16.
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because they so clearly do not explain the pattern of choice of law.
Each model in Table 10 is a logistic regression model in which the
dependent variable equals one if New York is the choice of law and
otherwise equals zero. The models exclude contracts of type "Other."
Model (1) contains dummy variables for each contract type, with
merger contracts as the reference category. Model (2) adds dummy
variables for the dominant place of incorporation. Model (3) adds
dummy variables for the dominant place of business, and model (4)
adds dummy variables for the attorney locale. Model (5) adds dummy
variables for second contracting party places of business and
incorporation.
Table 10. Logistic Regression Models of New York as Choice of
Law77
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable = NY choice of law
Asset sale purchase 0.526** 0.477* 0.455* 0.436* 0.456*
(2.86) (2.54) (2.41) (2.26) (2.33)
Bond indentures 3.698** 3.687** 3.732** 3.706** 3.584**
(12.80) (12.82) (12.68) (12.39) (11.87)
Credit commitments 1.539** 1.335** 1.307** 1.275** 1.341**
(8.13) (6.80) (6.61) (6.27) (6.33)
Employment contracts -0.507 -0.547+ -0.571+ -0.598+ -0.704*
(1.52) (1.65) (1.72) (1.78) (2.09)
Licensing 0.243 0.261 0.260 0.216 0.191
(0.64) (0.68) (0.68) (0.56) (0.48)
Pooling service 3.430** 3.431** 3.400** 3.362** 3.417**
(13.37) (13.19) (12.96) (12.43) (11.72)
Securities purchase 1.229** 1.231** 1.251** 1.237** 1.254**
(7.57) (7.41) (7.52) (7.28) (7.30)
Security agreements 1.987** 1.807** 1.876** 1.904** 1.881*
(5.52) (4.75) (5.06) (5.11) (4.83)
Settlements 0.074 -0.072 -0.043 -0.057 -0.135
(0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.38)
Trust agreements -0.164 -0.278 -0.287 -0.326 -0.458
(0.38) (0.61) (0.64) (0.72) (0.95)
Underwriting 4.219** 4.184** 4.210** 4.182"* 4.088**
(16.92) (16.44) (16.14) (15.79) (15.29)
CAcorp. -0.931** -0.745* -0.749* -0.590+
(3.31) (2.50) (2.51) (1.82)
MD corp. 0.352 0.333 0.360 0.435
(1.00) (0.95) (1.02) (1.20)
77 Model (5) includes, but we do not report here, dummy variables for second contracting
party places of business and incorporation. EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts
categorized as "Other"),
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NVcorp. -0.735** -0.710** -0.728** -0.575*
(2.81) (2.72) (2.79) (2.12)
NY corp. 2.228** 2.175** 2.160** 1.941**
(6.37) (6.19) (6.13) (5.38)
CA business -0.346* -0.356* -0.332*
(2.38) (2.26) (2.00)
FL business -0.258 -0.293 -0.066
(1.06) (1.22) (0.27)
TX business -0.412* -0.545** -0.399*
(2.37) (2.89) (2.00)
CA attorney -0.039 -0.009
(0.18) (0.04)
IL attorney -0.809* -0.855*
(2.30) (2.43)
MA attorney -0.593 -0.655+
(1.57) (1.69)
PA attorney 0.072 0.095
(0.20) (0.26)
TX attorney 0.485+ 0.611*
(1.82) (2.25)
Constant -1.604** -1.569** -1.475** -1.428** -1.360**
(12.15) (11.40) (10.35) (9.30) (8.65)
Observations 2414 2414 2414 2414 2414
Robust z statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The regression models confirm that, compared to the reference
category of merger contracts, New York law is chosen significantly
more often for all contract types other than employment, licensing,
settlements, and trust contracts. Incorporation in New York is
significantly associated with New York as the choice of law compared
to the reference category of Delaware incorporation. California or
Nevada incorporations are significantly associated with not selecting
New York law. California, Florida, and Texas as a place of business are
negatively associated with New York as a choice of law compared to
New York as a place of business, the reference category. The results for
California and Texas are statistically significant. An Illinois attorney
being associated with the contract is significantly associated with not
choosing New York law, compared to New York attorneys, the
reference category.78 Results do not materially change in model (5),
which includes variables for second contracting party places of business
and incorporation.
78 Additional models could plausibly explore multiple choice of law outcomes using
multinomial logistic regression. Because of New York's dominance, we limit our analysis to
when New York law is designated and avoid the complexity of reporting and interpreting
multinomial logic models.
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IV. CHOICE OF FORUM RESULTS
We now report results for forum selection clauses. 79 As in the case
of choice of law clauses, we first present the basic pattern and then
provide more complex analyses. Because the dominant result with
respect to choice of forum is that most contracts fail to designate a
forum, we model the decision to specify a forum. When a forum is
specified, it overwhelmingly corresponds with a contract's choice of
law. We therefore model when a forum specification does not match a
contract's choice of law.
A. Basic Pattern
Table 1 1 summarizes the distribution of choice of forum clauses.
The most prominent feature is the absence of forum clauses in 61
79 Like choice of law clauses, forum selection clauses are ordinarily enforced in courts of the
United States. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 62; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 80 (1989) ("The parties' agreement as to the place of the action will be given effect
unless it is unfair or unreasonable."). But the enforceability of these clauses probably remains
less certain than the enforceability of choice of law clauses. State courts sometimes refuse to
respect contractual agreements to litigate disputes in another forum in contexts where the chosen
forum has no reasonable relationship to the litigation. See, e.g., Nelson Energy Programs, Inc. v.
Oil & Gas Tech. Fund, Inc., 143 P.3d 50, 56 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevada hardly bears a
reasonable relationship to a transaction involving the solicitation of an investment by a Kansas
investor in a Kansas development program in exchange for conveyance of Kansas property.").
Conversely, a state court may employ a doctrine offorum non conveniens to refuse to accept its
designation by the contracting parties as the forum for resolving a dispute, in contexts where the
court concludes that the relevant contacts are much stronger with some other forum. See, e.g.,
Package Exp. Ctr., Inc. v. Snider Foods, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing
an action on forum non conveniens grounds despite a forum selection clause where chosen forum
had minimal connections with the litigation and where non-chosen forum had significant
connections-majority of witnesses resided there, the contract was to be performed there, and
breach occurred there). Some states-New York being an example-provide assurances to
parties in major commercial contracts that their courts will not turn away cases on forum non
conveniens grounds. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327
(McKinney 2009). Federal courts are highly receptive to forum selection clauses. Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Federal courts may transfer cases to the federal court selected by the parties even if state courts
where the federal court sits would reject the forum selection clause. See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (finding that federal law controls whether forum selection clause
would be enforced). Rice v. Bellsouth Adver. & Pub. Corp., 240 F. Supp. 2d 526 (W.D.N.C.
2002) (applying federal law to determine if forum selection clause by the parties was enforceable,
notwithstanding North Carolina law which held forum selection clauses per se invalid); see also
Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal law governs
the effect of forum selection clauses in diversity cases). But see Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc.,
381 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying the state law regarding forum selection clauses); Lev
v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 669 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that the
law of the forum state applies in deciding the validity of a forum selection clause).
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percent of the contracts. The most frequent state is New York, with 16
percent of the 62 contracts. Of the 39 percent of contracts designating a
forum, New York accounts for 41 percent of the selections, with
Delaware a distant second, accounting for 11 percent of the clauses.
Table 11. Choices of Forum8°




































































As in the case of choice of law clauses, a significant difference
exists between the broader data base and the merger contracts studied in
our previous work.81 Our earlier study found that Delaware lead as a
litigation forum choice for merger agreements, with New York being
selected as a forum only about two-thirds as often and California being
selected about half as often. No other state approached these three in
frequency of forum selection. When the full data set of contracts is
considered, a different pattern emerges. As shown in Table 6, New
York dominates, Delaware is selected at about one-quarter the New
York rate, and California is specified at about one-sixth the New York
rate.
The pattern of choice of forum is largely explained by choice of
law. The forum selected is usually the same as the state whose law is
specified to govern the dispute. The relationship between choice of law
and forum selection clauses is shown in Table 12. Table 12 reduces the
80 EDGAR, supra note 61.
81 Eisenberg & Miller, Mergers, supra note 4.
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geographical units to Delaware, New York, California and Other. As
before, all places of incorporation or choices of law other than
Delaware, New York, and California are coded as Other. The sample in
Table 12 excludes contracts that do not designate a forum or that
designate a bankruptcy forum. The table's boldface diagonal entries
indicate that the forum chosen is overwhelmingly the same as the law
chosen. For contracts designating New York law that designate a
forum, over 95 percent designate a New York forum.
Table 12. Choice of Law and Choice of Forum82
Choice of forum
Choice of law DE NY CA Other Total
DE 110 16 4 29 159
69.18 10.06 2.52 18.24 100.00
NY 7 439 3 7 456
1.54 96.27 0.66 1.54 100.00
CA 1 2 64 23 90
1.11 2.22 71.11 25.56 100.00
Other 3 5 2 383 393
0.76 1.27 0.51 97.46 100.00
Total 121 462 73 442 1,098
11.02 42.08 6.65 40.26 100.00
Table 12 also indicates a further flight from Delaware. Parties who
choose Delaware law are less likely to choose Delaware as a forum than
parties who choose non-Delaware law are to choose their choice of law
as choice of forum. While 159 contracts that designated a forum
selected Delaware law, only 121 contracts designated Delaware as the
forum. And only 69 percent of the contracts that choose Delaware law
also choose Delaware as the forum. New York shows a slight increase
in forum designations over choice of law, with 456 choices of law and
462 designations as forum. California, like Delaware, has fewer forum
designations than choices of law.
B. The Decision to Designate a Forum
Since most contracts do not specify a forum, and since contracts
overwhelmingly specify the place of choice of law as the choice of
forum, the decision to specify a forum is central to assessing the
observed choice of form pattern. For example, while New York
82 EDGAR, supra note 61 (sample limited to contracts that specify a choice of forum).
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dominates as a choice of law and forum, it is not the leader in the rate at
which contracts specify a forum. Table 13 shows the relation between
choice of law and the rate of forum specification.























The table shows that the range of forum specifications is fairly
narrow, from 36 percent for contracts specifying New York law to 44
percent for contracts specifying California law. Surprisingly, New
York, despite being the most specified choice of law and choice of
forum, also has the lowest rate of forum specifications. We explore the
source of the lower New York rate by breaking down the sample by
contract type in Table 14.
83 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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DE NY CA Other
0.41 0.51 0.40 0.41
0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
0.50 0.70 0.44 0.73
0.17 0.67 0.21 0.28
0.00 0.50 0.38 0.35
0.53 0.65 0.53 0.43
0.06 0.07 - 0.29
0.46 0.61 0.50 0.43
- 0.45 0.67 0.67
0.42 0.54 0.36 0.46
0.05 0.29 - 0.00
- 0.23 0.00 0.00
Table 14 shows that bare reliance on Table 13 is misleading. For
nine of twelve contract types, contracts designating New York law have
the highest rate of forum specification. For credit commitments, New
York barely trails California. Only for pooling service agreements and
security agreements does New York noticeably trail in the rate of forum
specification. New York's rank in Table 13 is a consequence of it being
designated the choice of law in the vast majority of pooling service
agreements (149 of 173 of those represented in Table 13), and pooling
service agreements having a low rate of forum specification.
Table 15 accounts for both choice of law and forum specification
in logistic regression models. Model 1, analogous to Table 13, shows
the California, Delaware, and "Other" choice of law dummy variables
to have positive coefficients. Since New York as the choice of law is
the reference category, this suggests that contracts designating New
York have a relatively low rate of forum specifications. Model 2, like
Table 14, accounts for both choice of law and contract type. New York
as the choice of law is again the reference category. Now the
California, Delaware, and "Other" choice of law dummy variables all
have negative, statistically significant coefficients. Once one accounts
for contract type, contracts designating New York law are significantly
more likely to specify a forum. Table 12 shows that the specified forum
is overwhelmingly New York.
84 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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New York thus is overwhelmingly the choice of law; contracts
specifying New York law tend to specify a forum; the forum specified
is almost always New York. New York's decades-long campaign to
attract legal business has been highly successful though usually
85 EDGAR, supra note 61 (excludes contracts categorized as "Other").
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overshadowed by the focus on Delaware's success in attracting
incorporations.
C. Exploring When Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Differ
Despite the overlap between forum selection and choice of law
clauses, the parties are not required to link the two. Table 12 shows that
they sometimes elect to specify the law of one state to govern the
dispute and the forum of another state as the place to resolve it. This
suggests investigating the circumstances under which a mismatch
between choice of law and choice of forum occurs.
Table 16 shows, for each contract type and selected choices of law,
the proportion of contracts that specify a forum different from the
choice of law specified in the contract. The table is based on a
mismatch variable that equals one when the contract specifies a forum
different from the choice of law and zero otherwise. We exclude from
the analysis contracts that do not specify a forum.
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Table 16. Contract Type, Choice of Law, and Mismatch of Choice











































The table shows that New York has a mismatch less frequently
than Delaware and California. The residual choice of law category
"Other" has the lowest rate of mismatch but that is understandable
because we count a match as occurring when both the choice of law and
choice of forum are Other. We do not pick up as a mismatch in this
analysis a choice of law that is "Other" but that differs from a choice of
forum that is a different Other than the choice of law. Our primary
interest is the comparison of the three specific states.
Table 16 shows that New York has a consistently low rate of
mismatches and that its lower overall rate is not a consequence of one or
two contract categories. California only has a lower mismatch rate for
credit commitments, a category in which California has only four
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contracts specifying a forum. Delaware only has a lower mismatch rate
than New York for settlement agreements, in which neither Delaware
nor New York has more than seven contracts specifying a forum.
Contracts specifying New York law therefore more consistently specify
New York as the litigation forum.
D. Federal and State Choice of Forum
We find little evidence that contracting parties strongly prefer state
courts or federal courts to the exclusion of the other. The strongest
evidence of this indifference is the 61 percent of contracts that do not
specify a forum at all. Additional evidence is the 1,064 contracts for
which we could determine whether a forum selection clause was
exclusive. Of these, 617 specified an exclusive forum but the dominant
exclusive factor was the state, not the federal or state court within the
state. While 530 exclusive-forum contracts specified an exclusive state
as litigation forum, the contracts rarely chose between state and federal
courts within a state. Only 85 specified an exclusive federal or state
court and these contracts were about evenly divided between state and
federal courts. Forty contracts specified an exclusive federal forum and
45 contracts specified an exclusive state forum. If the contracting
parties believed that federal or state courts were likely to provide more
efficient or fairer adjudication, that belief is not manifested in the
pattern of choice of forum clauses.
CONCLUSION
We find evidence that choice of law and choice of forum
provisions are negotiated in the material contracts of public firms. No
state's share of the market for these clauses exceeds 50 percent.
Although no state has more than 50 percent of the designations, New
York is clearly the dominant state with over 40 percent of the choices of
law and, given a choice of forum, over 40 percent of the forum
designations. New York's success appears to be combination of a
decades-long effort to attract contracts together with possible lender
insistence of New York law governing credit arrangements. Delaware
suffers a net outflow of choices of law and forum relative to its
connections to contracts through incorporation or other factors.
As might be expected, we find that a substantial degree of overlap
exists between choice of law and choice of forum. If a particular state's
law is chosen as applicable to the contract, that state's forum is also
likely to be selected. However, the overlap was not complete: some
15112009]
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contracts designated a forum to adjudicate disputes that was not located
in the state whose law was selected to govern the substantive issues.
Further, and quite interestingly, we find that while the contracting
parties always opted to include choice of law provisions in their
contracts, the same was not true for choice of forum provisions. Only 39
percent of the contracts contained litigation forum selection clauses.
Holding type of contract constant, contracts designating New York as
the choice of law tended to designate a choice of forum, also New York.
Given that the parties could easily select the forum as well as the
applicable law-and given that the forum selected can sometimes be as
important if not more important than the law chosen-the frequent
failure of the parties to specify a forum for resolution of disputes
presents a theoretical puzzle. Bargaining obstacles or agency problems
are possibly fruitful areas for future research.
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